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Bruna Fujimoto, 49 years old, the daughter of Japanese immigrants who arrived in Brazil in
the late 1950s, grew up in a small town with a sizable Japanese minority, where she worked as
a receptionist. She married a Brazilian of Italian origin at age 19 in order to please her parents,
who wished for her to stay close to home. However, not marrying a Japanese and never having
children disappointed her parents. In her early 40s she got divorced and has moved to Rio de
Janeiro five years ago, where she says she is “catching up on lost time”.
Ms. Fujimoto presents symptoms of fatigue, irritability, low appetite, and social withdrawal.
She attributes her symptoms to worries about securing steady employment, lack of a support
network in Rio de Janeiro, and guilt about her ailing mother who’s alone after her father’s
recent death. As well, she has been facing difficulties in finding a stable romantic partner,
expressing concern that her age and her ethnicity (“in between Japanese and Brazilian”) is
making it difficult for her to find a match. She finds that she is increasingly keeping to herself
and reports mounting anxiety over the past few weeks, particularly about her way of gazing at
and being with others, which has become reserved (isolated).
To make sense of Bruna Fujimoto’s suffering, we need to
understand it in cultural context. In this case, we have an ar-
ray of contexts to choose from, yet none of which precisely
match the North American and Western European settings in
which most psychology research is conducted (Henrich et al.,
2010). Do we try to understand Ms. Fujimoto as Japanese?
As Brazilian? As a second-generation migrant? As a rural-
to-urban migrant? Even the cultural psychology literature is
of limited help here — although there is a large literature on
the Japanese conducted in both Japan and in North America,
research on other areas of the world is sorely lacking (Molnar
et al., 2018).
Moreover, there is an unfortunate implicit assumption in
much of this research that people migrate from the global
south to the global north, especially to English-speaking
countries. Each sending country is understood as a homo-
geneous block, whereas receiving countries — such as Aus-
tralia, Canada, or the United States — are seen as multicul-
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tural, and increasingly so. Brazil is one of many countries
that defy this assumption. The territory now called Brazil
includes more than 300 indigenous groups who long pre-
date the onset of Portuguese colonialism in the 1500s (Fun-
dação Nacional do Índio, 2013). Waves of migration since
have brought Spanish, Africans, Italians, Germans, Japanese,
Syrian-Lebanese, and many others to Brazil over the past
several centuries. Indeed, multiculturalism is so fundamental
to Brazilian society that cultural variation is more often dis-
cussed in terms of race and socioeconomic status; for exam-
ple, skin color is the main criterion used by the demographic
census (Fish, 2008; IBGE, 2010).
A richer database, including both international research
that includes Brazil and intranational research that incorpo-
rates Brazil’s own diversity would doubtlessly help better un-
derstand Ms. Fujimoto clinical case. At the same time, the
complexity of individual clients will always outstrip what
we can learn by studying groups. A research database that
definitively teaches us how to work with second generation
Japanese Brazilians, might take so long to be created that by
then our clients will have found a different solution (or not).
We are therefore faced with the twin objectives of building a
more representative database while using the research avail-
able to help us develop an approach tailored to individual
sufferers. To these ends, the overarching goal of this chapter
is to introduce one way of thinking about this problem and
to consider the potential implications of this approach for
the Brazilian multicultural context. We hope this chapter’s
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lasting contribution will be to provoke a dialogue between
pertinent psychological traditions in the Lusosphere and An-
glosphere.
Cultural Psychology & Clinical Psychology
What is the best way to proceed, as psychologists, with
the oftentimes bewildering complexity of culture and the
myriad ways in which it shapes psychological functioning?
Over the past decade or so, an increasing number of schol-
ars have addressed this critical question, arguing in favor
of cultural-clinical psychology (Chentsova-Dutton & Ry-
der, 2019; Gone, 2015; Maercker et al., 2018; Ryder &
Chentsova-Dutton, 2015; Ryder et al., 2011). While there
is a long history of psychological research on mental health
in different cultural contexts, the field has lacked a unifying
perspective on how this ought to be done. Notable exceptions
notwithstanding, most psychological studies in this area are
either: (a) clinical studies that happen to be conducted in
‘other’ (i.e., ‘non-Western’) countries or in ethnic minority
samples; or (b) cross-cultural studies that happen to include
psychosocial adjustment measures as outcomes. The con-
sequence is that the psychological contribution to the inter-
disciplinary literature on culture and mental health has often
been marginal.
The first obstacle is ontological: mainstream psychology
emphasizes an individualistic, decontextualized, even atom-
ized human subject who is at the same time similar enough
to all other human subjects that any psychological process
worth investigating is assumed to be universal (for a sus-
tained objection to this view, see: Henrich et al., 2010). The
second obstacle is epistemological: an emphasis on tightly
controlled and replicable methods yielding quantitative re-
sults (M. Doucerain et al., 2017). Neither of these charac-
teristics of mainstream psychology should be abandoned ut-
terly, however. Indeed, we believe that cultural-clinical psy-
chology will best be in a position to fully contribute to the on-
going interdisciplinary conversation if it remains identifiable
as psychology. Psychology is, of course, the study of mind;
however, given the discipline’s ‘Western’ origins, the model
of mind that predominates is an individualistic one (Geertz,
1979; Gergen, 2009; H. R. Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Nis-
bett et al., 2001). While correctives to this are needed, we
believe that – given the context of other disciplines pushing
the reduction of the individual person to biological and/or so-
cial forces – cultural-clinical psychology contributes in part
by insisting that mind (self, psyche, the individual person,
etc.) cannot be forgotten.
Psychology has been described as a ‘hub science’ (Boyack
et al., 2005; Cacioppo, 2007), and although the discipline has
not always been comfortable with the requisite tensions, this
position is an important strength and it is maintained through
a continued emphasis on mind and its links to both brain
and culture. The two constituent subdisciplines of cultural-
clinical psychology facilitate this bridging: clinical psychol-
ogy emphasizes mind-brain connections, and does so with a
greater attention to mind than is typical of contemporary psy-
chiatry; cultural psychology emphasizes mind-culture con-
nections, and does so with a greater attention to mind than is
typical of anthropology.
Let us begin with cultural psychology (H. R. Markus &
Kitayama, 1991; Shweder, 1991), as it is here that cultural-
clinical psychology’s claims of making a break with main-
stream psychology can be observed most clearly. Over the
past few decades, several different fields have taken as a cen-
tral issue the interrelation of culture and psychology, and
many more researchers have taken on cross-cultural com-
parisons within mainstream psychology. These fields vary
widely in terms of how the key term, culture, is understood.
Although influenced by several of these perspectives, we em-
phasize a cultural psychology approach, whose core claim is
not simply that ethnic groups differ but rather that culture and
mind exist in a relation of mutual constitution. Neither can
be understood without the other, nor can one be reduced to
the other; in the words of Shweder (1991), they “make each
other up”. We emphasize this approach because of its par-
ticular conception of how culture and psychology interrelate,
and because it points to particular research strategies.
An important aspect of cultural-clinical psychology is the
focus on the person-in-context as the unit of analysis. This
aspect is prompted by concern for the individual sufferer, but
at the same time moving closer to anthropology. The dif-
ferentiation between ‘culture’ and ‘cultural group’ is central
here: the former should not, indeed cannot, be reduced to the
latter. Cultural groups are at best fuzzy categories and their
main purpose is to facilitate research, although when defined
carefully they may well map onto socially meaningful labels.
For example, several studies of somatic symptom presenta-
tions in depression have compared a Chinese sample with
some kind of ‘Western’ sample (Parker et al., 2001; Ryder
et al., 2008). This research design permitted direct empiri-
cal testing of Kleiman’s (1982) longstanding claim that so-
matic symptoms are presented more commonly by Chinese
depressed outpatients.
Yet, one must be cautious not to fall into the trap of assum-
ing that culture, here, is the simple fact of being in the Chi-
nese or ‘Western’ group. From cultural psychology we adopt
the view that although identifying group differences can be a
useful first step, we should then proceed to ‘unpack culture’
by testing specific hypotheses about why the cultural groups
differ. For example, Ryder and colleagues (2008) demon-
strated that differences between Chinese and Westerns’ pre-
sentation of depression symptoms could be explained by cul-
tural tendencies to focus on external stimuli (e.g., describ-
ing a situation) or internal stimuli (e.g., analyzing one’s own
thoughts and feelings in a situation). Such findings not only
allow us to better understand why the groups differ, they
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also permit predictions as to which individual people in a
given group will deviate from the general pattern—an im-
portant consideration for clinical work, especially if we want
to avoid reducing clients to group characteristics. Once we
appreciate that individual group members can adhere to, par-
tially adhere to, or reject a given belief or practice, we can
start investigating specific aspects of culture and how they
shape individuals in different ways.
The ‘cultural group’ perspective is bidirectional, which
means that we can also consider how these different and dif-
ferently situated people contribute to their cultural context.
Meanings and practices are distributed so that different peo-
ple within a cultural context can think and act in different,
even contradictory, ways that are equally culturally mean-
ingful. Culture cannot be reduced to mind, and indeed it
is much more useful to understand culture as taking place
‘among’ or ‘between’ minds. Neither can mind be reduced
to culture, as people are also shaped by their idiosyncratic
biographies—by their upbringings, learning histories, imme-
diate friendship networks, chance events, and so on. Behav-
iors are understood by actors and observers in terms framed
by a consensually-shared meaning system, and the very fact
that these behaviors are enacted and observed contributes to
shaping this system. In other words, culture happens ‘in the
head’ but equally ‘in the world’—and in this world, people
do not simply behave. Rather, they perform what Bruner
(1990) called “acts of meaning”.
Turning now to clinical psychology, we find both an em-
pirical discipline and an applied profession, one that under-
stands psychopathology at the level of mind and, increas-
ingly, due to neuroscience’s influence, at the interface of
mind and brain (Ilardi & Feldman, 2001). This influence
echoes similar developments in psychiatry (Insel & Quirion,
2005) although perhaps with a greater retention of mental,
primarily cognitive, concepts. The concern for mind-brain
links, particularly combined with the typically greater skep-
ticism towards psychiatric categories, is a major contribution
of clinical psychology to cultural-clinical psychology (Ryder
et al., 2011). We believe, however, that mainstream clini-
cal psychology research is adopting an increasingly impov-
erished view of mind (Miller, 2010). There is a tendency
to equate mind with brain, or with certain characteristics of
brain, and with that a tendency to see mind as locked in the
head with the brain. The alternatives to this tendency risk
committing Descartes’ error all over again by claiming that
mind and brain are different entities (Gobert, 2013), what
was criticized as “the ghost in the machine” (Ryle, 1949).
Psychology and the neurosciences are replete with argu-
ments to the effect that mind is subsumed by brain, or is
at best a subjective epiphenomenon of brain: the mind is a
reflex of the brain. We take a different view, and one that
is not that distant from the mind-brain dualism in the tradi-
tional sense (Ryder & Chentsova-Dutton, 2015; Ryder et al.,
2011). Nothing happens in the mind that is not reflected in
brain activity but at the same time, there are limits to the
brain’s explanatory power. The most obvious limit relates to
complexity, as relatively simple ideas at the mind-level may
be extremely difficult to describe as complex and changing
neural patterns. We do not need to deny that cars and busses
are composed of atoms in order to dismiss the utility of an
atomic theory of traffic patterns; similarly, preference for
mental explanations of certain phenomena does not require
us to deny the brain.
Does this mean that the mind-level is merely a tool of con-
venience; a shorthand to help us talk about complex brain
patterns? To an extent, yes — but one may go further. There
is a view emerging from philosophy, cognitive science, and
cultural psychology that understands the mind as fundamen-
tally social and tool-using (Hutchins, 1995; Valsiner & Van
der Veer, 2000; Vygotsky, 1978). One of the most famous
examples is the extended mind hypothesis, which argues that
there is little practical difference between a cognitive mod-
ule and a physical tool for problem solving (A. Clark &
Chalmers, 1998). In this sense, the relation between mind
and brain is similar to that between culture and mind, or brain
and culture: overlapping partially, but not completely (Ryder
& Chentsova-Dutton, 2015).
In one example, A. Clark and Chalmers (1998) compare a
person who uses their memory to walk to a desired location
to a person with a memory problem who habitually writes
down directions and then uses these notes to walk to the
same location. The idea of ‘tools’, moreover, can be broadly
interpreted to include other people. Perhaps Ms. Fujimoto
habitually used phone calls to her mother and affectionate
physical contact with her best friend in order to calm down
when stressed. In her new environment, she now encounters
more and unfamiliar stressors while having greatly reduced
access to important aspects of her emotion regulation system.
Reducing Ms. Fujimoto’s stress, increasing her distress tol-
erance, encouraging her to meet new people who could play
a similar role, or using technology to maintain more regu-
lar contact with her mother and best friend, are all plausible
ways of helping her to adjust to her new circumstances.
The brain is an integral part of any holistic systems view
of human psychology (Chiao, 2009; Han & Northoff, 2008;
Kitayama & Uskul, 2011) as it appears to be adapted quite
specifically for the acquisition of culture, responding to cul-
tural inputs with marked plasticity (Wexler, 2006). Still,
marked does not mean infinite; as well as the range of possi-
ble physical and social environments is vast, but also limited
(Ryder et al., 2011). The brain is vital to our understanding of
human psychology and culture not because it is a fixed entity
from which all causal arrows proceed, but precisely because
it is evolutionarily adapted and environmentally responsive,
astoundingly flexible and also constrained (Siegel, 2012).
Treating culture-mind-brain as a single system with mul-
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tiple levels has implications that include but go beyond the
traditional tripartite division of the biopsychosocial model.
To begin with, not even specific claims about a given disor-
der can be easily compartmentalized to a single level (Ry-
der & Chentsova-Dutton, 2015). Researchers once searched
for the distinction between endogenous and reactive syn-
dromes, hoping that the former would reflect a ‘brain de-
pression’ responsive to biological intervention and the lat-
ter would reflect a ‘mind depression’ responsive to psycho-
logical intervention (Kendell, 1976; Mendels & Cochrane,
1968). Instead, research has now firmly established that
pharmacological intervention affects self-concept, personal-
ity, and relationships with others; it has also established that
psychotherapy changes the brain, and that beliefs about psy-
chotherapy or pharmacotherapy help shape cultural norms
about treatment options (Knutson et al., 1998; Linden, 2006;
Pescosolido et al., 2010; Serretti et al., 2010).
We propose that if psychology could endorse a holistic vi-
sion of culture, mind, and brain, promoting research to link
these levels, the designation ‘cultural’ would no longer be
needed. ‘Cultural psychology’ would simply be ‘psychol-
ogy’; ‘cultural-clinical psychology’ would simply be ‘clini-
cal psychology’. Suspecting that fulfillment of this goal is
far in the future, we choose to emphasize culture-mind links
as a corrective to the increasingly neurobiological leanings
of contemporary psychology. We do not wish, however,
that this critique of neurobiological reductionism becomes
some kind of anti-biological alternative, but rather a call for
thoughtful and sustained integration. This integration has
a long history in psychology, dating back to Wundt’s volk-
erpsychologie (Allolio-Näcke, 2014), and we believe that re-
search conducted in this integrative tradition has much to of-
fer (Cole, 1998).
The Emergence and Maintenance of Psychopathology
The starting point for cultural-clinical psychology is very
broad indeed (Ryder et al., in press): the universe poten-
tially accessible to our perceptions demands radical simplifi-
cation. That is, we selectively attend to objects that move us
towards desired ends and away from undesired ends (Hirsh
et al., 2012; Lang et al., 1997). A given ‘object’ cannot be
understood separately from its constituent parts, its poten-
tial uses, and the situation in which it is encountered, not
because objects lack structure but because that structure can
be multiply construed (Hacking, 1999). Moreover, ‘desired’
and ‘undesired’ ends are by no means fixed, given that there
are an enormous variety of possible human goals. Even
universal goals are subject to considerable elaboration be-
yond evolved biological considerations. For example, the
culturally-shaped requirements of a religious fast can pro-
foundly modify biologically-shaped goal of pursuing food
when hungry (Ryder et al., in press).
Our goals are shaped by the social contexts in which we
socialize, through cultural schemas that direct our attention
to elements that allow us to build something meaningful both
personally and consensually (Carey, 2009). Schemas both
shape and are shaped by the perceived environment. Mem-
ory recollection is easier when remembered events are con-
sistent with schemas (H. R. Markus & Schwartz, 2010; Sa-
vani et al., 2010). Similarly, new information is not only in-
terpreted through schemas, but also serves to reinforce them
(H. R. Markus & Schwartz, 2010; Savani et al., 2010). Well-
established schemas profoundly shape how self, others, and
the environment are perceived, and can only change through
substantial amounts of important new information (Brewer
& Treyens, 1981; H. Markus, 1977; Rumelhard, 1984).
Some of the mechanisms through which cultural schemas
guide attention are scripts: an organized sequence of behav-
iors that are shared intersubjectively, which means that the
sequence is known and understood by others from the same
cultural context (Wan et al., 2010). Whereas schemas are
primarily described as in-the-head, scripts involve sequences
of action that can be enacted and observed by others in-the-
world (Bower et al., 1979; Schank & Abelson, 1977). Ms.
Fujimoto may not know what is wrong with her when she
presents at the clinic, but at least she knows what to do when
she arrives: she sits down, looks through a magazine, and
makes her way to the consulting room when her name is
called. Moreover, she finds the procedure in Rio de Janeiro is
not really so different than the one she remembers from her
hometown. Instead of planning out each step deliberately,
she can instead devote her limited resources to reading an in-
teresting article, planning dinner, or worrying about how best
to describe her experiences once she meets with the psychol-
ogist. There is a particular sequence that gets her from her
front door to the scheduled appointment, a sequence known
to Ms. Fujimoto, the psychologist, the receptionist, and the
others in the waiting room. Indeed, someone who repeated
all these steps in answer to the question, “how was your visit
to the clinic,” would be seen as rather odd. The model is part
of the background of meaning, the shared context in which
isolated behaviors become meaningful acts (Bruner, 1990;
Searle, 1980).
The notion of scripts has been subsequently adopted and
broadened by linguists interested in cultural models of be-
havior and cognition (Goddard & Wierzbicka, 2004) as well
as cognitive anthropologists and sociologists (D’Andrade,
1981; DiMaggio, 1997). In their case, scripts refer to inter-
pretive rules by which one understands behaviors, emotions,
social relationships, and so on; for example, one might de-
scribe a cultural script for ‘having a friend’ (M. M. Doucerain
et al., 2018). Therefore, cultural scripts can be understood
in a continuum that goes from the specific and concrete to
the general and abstract. The closer a given script is to the
former, the more it will adhere to the specific expectations
of cognitive research; indeed, such research could be used to
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determine whether one is working with this kind of script.
Each set of specific symptoms is part of a larger set of
potential symptoms: experiences grounded in our physical
and existential reality that could, in some contexts, be expe-
rienced and expressed as symptoms (Ryder et al., in press).
Many of these experiences may in fact be surprisingly com-
mon, at least in mild forms, and they come and go: the ma-
jority pass by unnoticed, others are noticed momentarily but
are deemed unworthy of attention, others still might be iden-
tified as strange or annoying, but not especially alarming. In
short, our phenomenological fields continuously register po-
tentially symptomatizable experiences (Ryder & Chentsova-
Dutton, 2015). These aches, worries, ambiguous interper-
sonal exchanges, even transient odd experiences, are part of
the background noise that might — but most often does not
— emerge as a distressing symptom.
This background noise fluctuates for all kinds of reasons,
which become part of the proximate cause of a particular
symptom. Different circumstances elicit different emotional
reactions, which come with various sets of physiological sen-
sations, subjective experiences, and behavioural responses,
as well as their own associated cultural scripts. There are
also individual differences in the likelihood of having and
attending to particular experiences (Kirmayer & Sartorius,
2007). Demographic characteristics (e.g., age); personality
traits (e.g., neuroticism); social roles (e.g., a subordinate po-
sition); or gender, in sexist societies (Zanello, 2018), might
increase the likelihood that one might attend to chest pain or
a shift in mood, or even feel about to have a “crise de ner-
vos” (“nervous breakdown”, Duarte, 1986; Silveira, 2000).
Individual differences also emerge through variations in per-
sonal biography as different people have lived different ex-
periences. Past history of heart attack might increase vig-
ilance for chest pain; having a depressed family member
might cause one to attend more to shifts in mood; a period
of unemployment, as the one currently faced in Brazil, might
increase concern about interactions with one’s boss or job.
For a variety of reasons, certain experiences within this
chaotic and shifting background noise are identified as wor-
thy of sustained attention. These experiences might violate
cultural scripts for normalcy — our consensually shared un-
derstandings of how people normally think, feel, and act, as
well as how they ought to think, feel, and act (Chentsova-
Dutton & Ryder, under review). For example, different cul-
tural contexts have different scripts for negative emotions:
how valued they are, when one should display them, what be-
liefs do we have about someone who shows them frequently,
and so on. Russian cultural contexts foster beliefs to the ef-
fect that a full life includes a range of emotions, including
negative ones; Chinese cultural contexts emphasize the im-
portance of restraining both positive and negative emotions;
American cultural contexts promote the view that the good
life involves many positive emotional experiences and few
negative ones (Chentsova-Dutton, Senft, et al., 2014; Eid &
Diener, 2009).
Certain experiences are identified as deviating sufficiently
from these norms that they are seen not just as different but as
abnormal: they are pathologized (Haslam et al., 2007). These
cultural scripts for deviancy are therefore in the unusual po-
sition of normalizing the abnormal, or at least of rendering
the abnormal sufficiently comprehensible to guide thought,
feeling, and action. These scripts help the sufferer to make at
least partial sense of his or her suffering (Chentsova-Dutton
& Ryder, under review). Indeed, the literature on labeling of
mental illness illustrates both the advantages and disadvan-
tages of ‘making sense’ in this way. Many patients report
a sense of relief that comes with knowing that their chaotic
and frightening experiences are a specific known entity, one
that comes with its own expected symptoms, explanations,
and prognosis (Chentsova-Dutton, Ryder, & Tsai, 2014). On
the other hand, there is evidence that the application of a la-
bel, and hence priming the implied scripts for how one is
supposed to think, feel, and act, can imprison a patient’s
responses within the expectations that come with the label
(Link & Phelan, 1999).
Considering that diagnostic systems, and therefore labels,
are culturally construed, cultural issues should be taken into
account when assessing patients. For example, ‘tearfulness’
is often cited in diagnostic classification manuals as indica-
tive of ‘sadness’, one of the main criteria in the diagnosis
of a depressive episode (Zenello, 2014). In sexist cultures,
expressions of vulnerability, such as tearfulness, are socially
repressed in men (Windmöller & Zanello, 2019), but allowed
and even encouraged in women (Zanello, 2018). Therefore,
it is possible that epidemiological differences between men
and women in the world-wide prevalence of depression —
much higher for women (WHO, 2008) — are, at least par-
tially, a reflex of cultural constructs regarding gender roles.
In that case, it would be important that Ms. Fujimoto’s clini-
cian considers the meaning of her symptoms in the Brazilian
cultural context. For example, in respect to preoccupations
regarding her love life: what does it mean to be single for a
woman, who’s no longer considered young, in a sexist cul-
tural context (Zanello, 2018)?
Similarly, Ms. Fujimoto’s clinician should consider
whether the duration and severity of her symptoms could
be understood as bereavement, given her recent loss. In a
depressive reaction to bereavement, we begin with the ex-
pectations for the emotional range considered normal within
a given cultural context. In the immediate wake of be-
reavement, we observe an experience of profound sadness,
lethargy, and sleeplessness; reactions that are at once un-
usual and normal under the circumstances. At a certain point
— differing markedly depending on the cultural context —
this normal bereavement shades into pathology. In ‘West-
ern’ contexts, if it is too intense and it goes on too long, al-
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though it can still be partially understood in reference to the
bereavement experience, it can also be understood through
cultural scripts pertaining to what might be called Major De-
pression. Finally, there is a small subset of people, whose
response to bereavement involves manic giddiness, violating
even the expectations of a cultural script for Major Depres-
sion (Chentsova-Dutton & Ryder, under review; Morgan et
al., 2001).
Cultural scripts lead people to attend to particular expe-
riences when they occur, but attentional processes also con-
tribute to the emergence of these experiences as symptoms.
By leading people to devote more attentional resources to
scanning particular features of their phenomenological field,
scripts increase the likelihood of detecting an instance of
it. If one expects to have a particular emotional response,
scanning for signs of that response increases the likelihood
of detecting it, and can even make it stronger (Ryder &
Chentsova-Dutton, 2015). Moreover, particularly in the case
of thoughts, scanning for something can actually help to
create an instance of it. If a person enters a church con-
cerned about having a blasphemous thought, the very fact
of self-monitoring for such thoughts will increase their like-
lihood (Ryder et al., in press). Meanwhile, all kinds of other
thoughts, emotions, sensations, which are also potentially
symptomizable experiences, are taking place simultaneously,
but they fade into the background as they do not fit the avail-
able interpretive lenses.
Symptoms thus emerge as the consequence of loops,
wherein the response to a particular experience further ex-
acerbates it. For example, the cognitive-behavioral model
of social anxiety posits that fear of negative evaluation leads
one to self-monitor for signs that one is not doing well so-
cially. The consequence is that ambiguous signs, common
in social interactions, are more likely to be interpreted neg-
atively as evidence of social failure. As anxiety mounts,
self-monitoring increases along with physiological arousal;
moreover, dedicating attentional resources to closely track-
ing one’s social performance might lend a ‘forced’ quality to
the interaction, increasing the likelihood to the very negative
evaluation that is so feared (D. M. Clark & Wells, 1995). A
person with social anxiety is failing at the culturally valued
goal of self-confidently and presenting a positive ‘true self’
to others. In societies where people frequently have to enter
new social situations, such anxieties can be quite damaging
(Sato et al., 2014).
Similar social loops can be observed in Japan, but there
the predominant concern is with offending other people or
making them uncomfortable. The result is a somewhat dif-
ferent set, albeit overlapping, set of symptoms; for example,
concerns about subtle eye movements or even body odor, a
syndrome known as taijin kyofusho. Far from being con-
cerned about confident self-presentation, many socially anx-
ious Japanese are concerned about inadvertently revealing
more of one’s interior thoughts and feelings than would be
appropriate (Sasaki et al., 2013). In contrast, to the North
American and Western European settings where most social
anxiety research has been conducted, Japan is characterized
by relatively low levels of relational mobility. Maintaining
harmony is much more important than confidently winning
over new people. Indeed, perceptions of relational mobil-
ity have been shown to mediate the presentation of Japanese
social anxiety symptoms, with low mobility increasing the
likelihood of a symptom presentation consistent with taijin
kyofusho.
The attention-directing effects of these scripts do not stop
with the emergence of a symptom or a set of symptoms.
Rather, the identification of a symptom can bring with it fur-
ther interpretations, which can trigger emotional responses,
which themselves come with a whole set of potential so-
matic, cognitive, and behavioural consequences. These more
acute positive feedback loops are joined by more chronic
negative feedback loops which can serve to maintain patho-
logical patterns. A person with social anxiety might suffer
through a conversation, paying so much attention to the signs
of failure that they do not even notice what goes well, rein-
forcing the belief that conversations are highly negative ex-
periences. Or they might take the opportunity to avoid the
conversation entirely, feeling a surge of relief — again, rein-
forcing the belief that conversations are highly negative ex-
periences (D. M. Clark & Wells, 1995; Ryder & Chentsova-
Dutton, 2015).
It is our understanding that these loops do not emerge
from a specific level, but rather from links throughout the
culture-mind-brain system, ranging from specific brain cir-
cuits to social institutions (Ryder et al., in press). The distinc-
tion between disorders with a higher versus lower propensity
to show these kinds of loops may prove to be a more useful
distinction than that between ‘mental disorders’ and ‘phys-
ical disorders’. Cases in which the consequences of a dis-
ordered system loop back to further shape that system high-
light the importance of an approach that understands culture-
mind-brain as an integrated system.
For example, depression may lead to a constant need for
reassurance, leading to an interpersonal style that alienates
close others, and, consequently, influences the experience
and expression of the depression itself (Hudson et al., 2018;
Joiner, 1994; Starr & Davila, 2008). A broken leg may also
elicit responses from close others and the larger society. We
can talk about the subjective experience of a broken leg, so-
cial representations of a broken leg, a cultural script for re-
covery from a broken leg, and so on. Indeed, we can even
imagine a society where a broken leg is stigmatized (Olyan,
2008). Although these aspects of a broken leg pertain to the
sufferer’s experience and the context of his or her suffering,
none of them affect the location or severity of the break. In
depression, by contrast, personal experiences and social un-
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derstandings act as feedback loops that further shape the dis-
order.
Some Implications of Cultural-Clinical Psychology
Cultural-clinical psychology is grounded in an empiri-
cal literature from psychological science and adjacent disci-
plines. At the same time, there is much work still to be done,
not least because core ideas of cultural-clinical psychology
imply approaches to research that are not yet widely repre-
sented in the literature. A ‘culture-mind-brain’ perspective
can remind investigators that other levels of analysis should
be considered. However, much more is possible. In fact,
an interdisciplinary team in Brazil is conducting exciting re-
search of this kind. Dressler (2012) has proposed the cultural
consonance approach, in which the degree to which one can
live in accordance with local cultural models is associated
with various health outcomes. For example, Dressler and
colleagues have identified a culture-gene interaction in pre-
dicting depressive symptoms, finding that (a) consonance of
one’s actual family life with the local model of a good fam-
ily life interacted with (b) serotonin receptor polymorphism
to (c) predict depressive symptoms (Dressler et al., 2016;
Dressler et al., 2009).
There is also a need for more collaborative, interdisci-
plinary research on the emergence of symptoms. Presently,
much of the work in this area documents cross-cultural
symptom differences without necessarily documenting the
specific mechanisms by which specific symptoms emerge in
specific contexts. Inspiration can be drawn from research
documenting the wide range of symptoms that can emerge in
response to expectancy effects (Schwarz et al., 2016). For ex-
ample, studies of people who report somatic symptoms in the
presence of electromagnetic radiation, such as wifi signals,
suggest that exposure to media reports can increase symptom
reporting (Bräscher et al., 2017; Rubin et al., 2010; Witthöft
et al., 2018). The mechanisms at work here have been linked
to the so called ‘nocebo effect’, in which descriptions of
possible placebo pill side-effects increase the likelihood that
these symptoms will spontaneously occur (Benedetti et al.,
2007). ‘Cultural expectancies’ about mental disorder might
be studied similarly to investigate how link individual and
consensually-held beliefs influence cultural group variation
in symptoms (Chentsova-Dutton & Ryder, 2019).
Cultural-clinical psychology also has implications for
clinical practice, and indeed the perspective reviewed here
may seem to make this work more complicated. In this chap-
ter we have questioned both cultural and diagnostic cate-
gories, yet evidence-based assessment and treatment in clin-
ical psychology has largely depended on these categories.
A ‘culturally competent’ practitioner might be expected to
know that Test A is valid for Disorder B in Culture C, lead-
ing one to deliver Treatment D. The question is: could such
an approach be used to help someone like Ms. Fujimoto?
Should the clinician use standard American norms, Brazilian
norms, or Japanese norms when testing? Would the test yield
a diagnosis that fits the problems? How then to proceed with
treatment? Is it reasonable to ever expect tests normed to
Brazilians of Japanese origin or standardized treatments for
this population? Are the alternatives either to ignore culture
and proceed with standard practice or to engage with culture
in an intuitive manner?
Recall that towards the beginning of this paper we argued
that the unit of analysis in cultural-clinical psychology ought
to be the person-in-context. This perspective, combined with
recent developments in assessment and treatment, point to
some potential solutions. The Cultural Formulation Inter-
view (CFI) has been proposed in DSM-5 as a means by
which clinicians can learn more about the cultural contexts
of their patients (Lewis-Fernández et al., 2013). Crucially,
the CFI orients clinicians towards the patients’ accounts of
their own beliefs and beliefs prevalent in their communi-
ties, and away from stereotyped perceptions about ‘Brazil-
ians’ or ‘Japanese’. In the literature on evidence-based treat-
ment, meanwhile, we are observing a move away from treat-
ments designed for specific diagnoses to those designed for
transdiagnostic problems in living. This move is facilitated
by a renewal of interest in the evidence supporting specific
interventions rather than heterogeneous treatment packages
(Barlow et al., 2017; Hayes & Hofmann, 2018). We believe
such approaches hold promise as a way out of the appar-
ent dilemma between evidence-based practice and culturally
sensitive care (Gone, 2015).
Cultural-clinical psychology will be able to help Ms. Fu-
jimoto’s clinician — and hence, Ms. Fujimoto — through
joint attention to the global and the local. Globally, a grow-
ing multicultural and multinational database will help re-
searchers and clinicians alike. The point here is not to add
to the list of broad national groups about whom generaliza-
tions are made. Rather, the goal should be to broaden the
range of possibilities considered when working with diverse
experiences of suffering and healing. Ms. Fujimoto’s clini-
cian does not need to know the specific literature on Japanese
emotional disorders or ethnic minority experiences in Brazil;
rather, she should learn about the many ways in which cul-
ture shapes depression or minority experiences impact well-
being. Such learning requires vastly improved communica-
tion across linguistically and culturally separated research
communities. We hope this document might serve as a small
step towards this end.
Locally, the clinician should work with the person-in-
context, understanding her patient as embedded in what an-
thropologists sometimes call ‘local social world’. Informed
by knowledge about what works in general, Ms. Fujimoto’s
clinician will be much better able to deliver a treatment that
makes sense for this particular sufferer, in this particular con-
text. Global collaboration and local engagement will both be
8 RYDER ET AL.
needed to help us meet this challenging goal.
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